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Abstract
Efficient Instantiation of LWE-based
Public-Key Encryption and Commitment
Schemes with application to Threshold
Cryptosystems
Jinsu Kim
Department of Mathematical Sciences
The Graduate School
Seoul National University
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem has been used as a underlying
problem of a variety of cryptographic schemes. It makes possible construct-
ing advanced solutions like fully homomorphic encryption, multi linear map
as well as basic primitives like key-exchange, public-key encryption, signa-
ture. Recently, developments in quantum computing have triggered interest
in constructing practical cryptographic schemes. In this thesis, we propose ef-
ficient post-quantum public-key encryption and commitment schemes based
on a variant LWE, named as spLWE. We also suggest related zero-knowledge
proofs and LWE-based threshold cryptosystems as an application of the pro-
posed schemes. In order to achieve these results, it is essential investigating
the hardness about the variant LWE problem, spLWE. We describe its the-
oretical, and concrete hardness from a careful analysis.
Key words: lattice, learning with errors, LWE, sparse, public-key encryp-
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With advances in quantum computing, many people in various fields are
working on making their information security systems resistant to quantum
computing. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) has announced
a plan to change its Suite B guidance [NSA15], and the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is preparing a standardization of
post-quantum crypto for the transition into quantum-resistant cryptography
[NIS15]. There have been also substantial support for post-quantum cryp-
tography project from national funding agencies including the PQCRYPTO
projects [DL+15] in Europe.
In that sense, lattice-based cryptography is a promising field to conduct
practical quantum-resistant research. This is due to the seminal work of Ajtai
[Ajt96] who proved a reduction from the worst-case to the average-case for
some lattice problems. This means that certain problems are hard on aver-
age, as long as the related lattice problems are hard in all cases. This enables
provably secure constructions of cryptographic schemes unless all instances
of related lattice problems are easy to solve. Another remarkable work in
lattice-based cryptography is the introduction of Learning with Errors prob-
lem (LWE) by Regev in [Reg09]. This work shows that there exists a quantum
reduction from some worst-case lattice problems (the shortest independent
vectors problem, the shortest vector problem with a gap) to LWE. With a
1
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strong security guarantee, LWE makes versatile cryptographic constructions
possible including fully homomorphic encryption, multi-linear map which are
not ever constructed with classical problems. For more details, we refer to
the recent survey [Pei16].
In order to increase efficiency on lattice-based cryptographic schemes, ring
structured problems such as Learning with Errors over the ring (RLWE) and
NTRU [LPR10, Joe98] have received much attentions. A major advantage of
using a ring structure is that one can get a relatively smaller key size and
faster speed. For that reason, a lot of works about cryptographic schemes
with practical implementation have been proposed in RLWE and NTRU set-
tings: public-key encryptions ([DCRVV15, RVM+14, LSR+15]), signatures
([EBB13, DDLL13, GLP12]), key-exchanges ([BCNS15, Sin15]). However,
additional ring structures may give some advantages to attackers. As an ex-
ample, some analyses using the ring structure have been proposed recently.
In particular, some NTRU-based fully homomorphic encryptions proved val-
ueless [ABD16, CJL16] and some parameters of RLWE are confirmed to be
weak [HKK15, HKK16]. Hence, there are growing concerns about the security
gap for ring-structured cryptosystems.
On the other hand, it is reported that LWE-based signatures [DDLL13,
GLP12, DEBG+14] achieve good performance without the use of RLWE, and
studies of practicality of LWE-based key exchange protocols have been re-
cently started in [BCD+16]. However, less attention has been paid to effi-
cient instantiations of LWE-based cryptosystems, commitments and related
protocols. In that sense, proposing of efficient LWE-based public-key encryp-
tion and commitment schemes would be an interesting topic in lattice-based
cryptography. However, constructing of such schemes, which satisfy both
high levels of security and efficiency, is a very non-trivial work and would be
a hard task. it requires a suitable balance between security and efficiency to
constitute a complete proposal, which considers practical usage of them.
This thesis mainly concerns about efficient instantiations of LWE-based
public-key encryption and commitment schemes with a variant of LWE with
2
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sparse secret which is known as spLWE in [CHK+16]. This also enables effi-
cient instantiations of LWE-based zero knowledge protocols as well. In par-
ticular, a zero knowledge proof of opening information of commitments, and
zero knowledge proofs which can prove some relations among those com-
mitments are suggested. All of theses allow us to make known LWE-based
threshold cryptosystems actively secure. In particular, this thesis suggest a
threshold version of LWE-based PKE, [48], which has active security, and
IND-CCA security in random oracle model.
On the other hand, the use of sparse secret for efficient instantiation has
one drawback. It requires relatively larger dimension than that of LWE to
maintain security. This is a significant factor for the performance of LWE-
based schemes. A important question then arises: How large dimension is
needed to maintain security? Our main observation is that the problem of
increase in dimension can be relieved by using a small modulus q. Since the
security of LWE is proportional to the size of dimension and error rate, smaller
modulus leads to larger error rate. In conclusion, we can choose a relatively
small modulus q in spLWE-based encryption and commitment schemes from
a thoughtful analysis.
In order to describe the conclusion, we first define the variant problem,
spLWE, and provide analysis for it: We show that spLWE can be reduced
from LWE, which means that the hardness of spLWE can also be based on
the worst-case lattice problems. We also extend all known LWE attacks to
investigate concrete hardness of spLWE. These are used to select efficient
and secure parameters. A remark is that we exclude the parameters which
have provable security from our reduction under the consideration about
practicality. Our reduction serves to guarantee the hardness of spLWE, but is
not tight enough to be useful in setting concrete parameters for our scheme.
Next, we propose post-quantum public-key encryption and commitment
schemes with related zero knowledge protocols based on spLWE. More con-
cretely, we suggest an IND-CPA PKE inspired from [Pei14] and its IND-CCA
conversion in the quantum random oracle model by applying the modified
3
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Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion of Unruh [TU15]. In commitment case, we give
a variety of versions of commitment schemes which are based on a general-
ization of the LPN-based commitment scheme in [JKPT12]. We also propose
a commitment scheme dedicated for zero-knowledge proofs suggested in this
thesis. Finally, as a application, we show how to convert our PKE into a
threshold cryptosystem with active security.
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In this thesis, we use upper-case bold letters to denote matrices, and
lower-case bold letters for column vectors. For a distribution D, a ← D
denotes choosing an element according to the distribution of D and a← Dm
means that each component of a is sampled independently from D. For a
set A, U(A) means a uniform distribution on the set A and a← A denotes
choosing an element according to the uniform distribution on A. We denote
by Zq = Z/qZ = {0, 1 · · · , q − 1} and T = R/Z the additive group of real
numbers modulo 1, and Tq the a subgroup of T having order q, consisting
of {0, 1
q
, · · · , q−1
q
}. The 〈 , 〉 means the inner product of two vectors and [x]i
means the its i-th component.
2.2 Cryptographic notions
In this section, we provide cryptographic notions required in this thesis.
2.2.1 Key Encapsulation Mechanism
A key encapsulation mechanism (in short, KEM) is a key exchange algo-
rithm to transmit an ephemeral key to a receiver with the receiver’s public
5
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
key. It differs from encryption scheme where a sender can choose a message.
The sender cannot intend to make a specific ephemeral key. A KEM with
ciphertext space C and key space K consists of polynomial time algorithms
Setup, Keygen, Encap(may be randomized), Decap(should be deterministic):
• Params outputs a public parameters.
• Keygen outputs a public encapsulation key pk and secret decapsulation
key sk.
• Encap takes an encapsulation key pk and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C
and a key k ∈ K.
• Decap takes a decapsulation key sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs
some k ∈ K ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ denotes decapsulation failure.
2.2.2 Commitment Scheme
Intuitively, commitment schemes can be regard as a digital version of a
secure box. Thus anyone can commit to secret values without revealing about
their information. Whenever checking for the committed values is needed, he
convinces to a verifier that the value claimed by the committer is indeed the
value in the secure box. we give a formal definition of commitment schemes
[JKPT12], [BKLP15] A commitment scheme with message spaceM consists
of PPT(probabilistic polynomial time) algorithms Setup, Com, Ver:
• Setup(1k, 1κ) The setup algorithm Setup takes as input 1k, 1κ for secu-
rity parameters k, κ, and outputs a public key pk with public parame-
ters.
• Com(pk,m) The commitment algorithm Com takes as input a public




• Ver(pk, c,m, d) A verification algorithm Ver takes as input a public key
pk, a message m, a commitment c, and a reveal value d. It returns 1 or
0 to accept or reject, respectively.
Our commitment scheme satisfies the following security requirements:
• Correctness : The verification algorithm Ver outputs 1 with overwhelm-




Ver(pk, c,m, d) = 1 : pk ← setup(1k, 1κ), (c, d)← Com(pk,m)
]
= 1− negl(k).
• Computational Hiding : Every commitment computationally hides the committed
messages. Formally, for every probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A
there is a negligible function negl(k) such that:
Pr

pk ← Setup(1k, 1κ), (m,m′, aux)← A(pk)
b = b′ : b← {0, 1}, (c, d) = Com(mb, pk)
b′ ← A(c, aux)
 ≤ 12 + negl(k)
.
• Perfect Binding : Every commitment cannot be opened to different messages. This
means that the following holds with overwhelming probability over the choice of
the public key pk ← Setup(1k, 1κ):
(Ver(pk, c,m, d) = 1) ∧ (Ver(pk, c,m′, d′) = 1)⇒ m = m′
2.2.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Σ-Protocols
A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is a two party, prover and verifier
(in short, P and V), protocol. In this protocol, P can convince V that he
knows some secret information without revealing anything about the secret
apart from what is exposed by the claim itself. (For a formal definition,
see Bellare and Goldreich’s work [BG92]). Proof of knowledges are usually
designed by using Σ-protocols [Cra96, Dam10]. Our Zero-knowledge proofs
are instantiations of the following definition, which is a generalization of
the standard notion of Σ-protocols, and is introduced by Benhamouda et al.
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[BCK+14, BKLP15] in order to achieve negligible soundness error probability
of their protocols without parallel repetitions.
Definition 2.2.1. Let (P, V ) be a two-party protocol, where V is PPT, and
let L,L′ ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be languages with witness relations R ⊆ R′ ⊆ {0, 1}∗ ×
{0, 1}∗. Then (P, V ) is called a Σ′ -protocol for R,R′ with completeness error
α, challenge set C, public input c and private input w, if and only if it satisfies
the following conditions:
• Three-move form:
• On input (c, w), P computes a commitment t and sends it to V .
• On input c, V samples a challenge d← C and sends it to P .
• P sends a response s to the verifier.
• V accepts or rejects the proof depending on the protocol transcript
(t, d, s) with public input c. Here, (t, d, s) is called accepting tran-
script, if the verifier accepts the protocol run with (t, d, s).
• Completeness: Whenever (c, w) ∈ R, V accepts with probability 1− α
for some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
• Special soundness: There exists a PPT algorithm E (the knowledge
extractor) which takes two accepting transcripts (t, d, s), (t, d′, s′) where
d 6= d′, and outputs w′ such that (c, w′) ∈ R′.
• Special honest-verifier computational zero-knowledge: There exists a
PPT algorithm S (the simulator) taking c ∈ L and d ∈ C as inputs,
that outputs triples (t, d, s) whose distribution is computationally in-
distinguishable from accepting protocol transcripts generated by real
protocol runs.
We would like to give intuitive remarks regarding the above definition.
First, α > 0 means even an honest prover sometimes fails to prove knowl-
edge correctly. This is the case of our zero-knowledge proofs like [BCK+14,
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BKLP15, BDOP16], which have rejection sampling procedures in their proto-
cols. Second, special soundness property says that even an dishonest prover,
which does not know any w’s such that (c, w) ∈ R′ can knows a witness w0
such that (c, w0) ∈ R′ from the given two accepting transcripts. Thus, an
dishonest prover can answer correctly at most one challenge, i.e. the sound-
ness error is 1/|C|. ([Dam10]) Finally, the existence of a such simulator in
zero-knowledge property means the corresponding real protocol reveals no
information about w. Unlike real protocols, a challenge d is determined in
advance before fixed a commitment t in the proof. This is possible by rewind-
ing the random tape of a honest-verifier.
2.3 Lattices
A lattice L ⊆ Rm is a set of integer linear combinations of a {b1, · · · ,bn}




aibi : ai ∈ Z}
The set of vectors {b1, . . . ,bn}, and its matrix form B are called a basis, and
basis matrix of L respectively. Two bases matrices B1 and B2 describe the
same lattice, if and only if B2 = B1U, where U is a unimodular matrix, i.e.
det(U) = ±1, U ∈ Zm×m. Dimension of a lattice is defined as cardinality of
a basis, i.e. n = dim(L). If n = m, we call lattice L to a full rank lattice. A
sublattice is a subset L′ ⊂ L which is also a lattice. We define determinant




A length of the shortest vector in a lattice L(B) is denoted by λ1(L(B)).
More generally, the i-th successive minima λi(L) is defined as the smallest
radius r such that dim(span(L ∩ B(r))) ≥ i where B(r) is a n dimensional
ball with radius r. There exist several bounds and estimations for the length
of the shortest vector in a lattice.
9
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• Minkowski’s first theorem: λ1(L(B)) ≤
√
n(detL(B))1/n





The dual lattice of L, denoted L̄, is defined to be L̄ = {x ∈ Rn : ∀v ∈
L, 〈x,v〉 ∈ Z}. In this thesis, we mainly deal with q-ary integer lattices when
solving LWE problem. A q-ary lattice is a full-ranked lattice Λ such that
qZm ⊆ Λ ⊆ Zm. Such q-ary lattices with a basis matrix A ∈ Zm×n are
denoted by,
Λq(A) = {x ∈ Zm|∃y ∈ Zn : x = Ay mod q}
Λ⊥q (A) = {x ∈ Zm|Ax = 0 mod q}
We would like to note that given a matrix A ∈ Zmn, one can find a basis
of Λq(A). With high probability, the determinant of a q-ary lattice is q
m−n
when m is relatively larger than n.
We recall the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization that is closely related with
lattice basis reduction. The Gram-Schmidt algorithm computes orthogonal
vectors {b∗1, . . . ,b∗m} iteratively as follows:









The goal of lattice (basis) reduction is to find a good basis for a given lattice.
A basis is considered good, when the basis vectors are almost orthogonal and
correspond approximately to the successive minima of the lattice. Perfor-
mance of lattice reduction algorithms is evaluated by the root Hermite factor
δ0 defined by
δ0 = (||v||/det(L)1/n)1/n
where v is the shortest vector of the reduced output basis.
10
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2.4 Discrete Gaussian Distribution
For given s > 0, a discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice L ⊆ Rm
centered at v ∈ Rm is defined as DL,v,s(x) = ρv,s(x)/ρv,s(L) for any x ∈ L,
where




We note that the standard deviation is σ = s/
√
2π. Alternatively, we can
represent the Gaussian function ρv,s(x) as ρv,σ(x) then the discrete Gaussian
distribution DL,v,s(x) is defined as DL,v,s(x) = DL,v,σ(x) = ρv,σ(x)/ρv,σ(L)
where




When L = Z, v = 0, we omit the subscript L, v respectively and denote
DZm,v,σ(x) by D
m
v,σ(x). We collect some useful lemmas related to a discrete
Gaussian distribution.
Lemma 2.4.1 ([Ban95], Lemma 2.4). For any real s > 0 and T > 0, and
any vector x ∈ Rn, we have
Pr[|〈x, DnZ,s〉| ≥ T · s‖x‖] < 2 exp(−π · T 2).
Lemma 2.4.2 ([Reg05], Corollary 3.10). Let L be an n-dimensional lat-
tice, let u, z ∈ Rn be arbitrary vectors, and let r, α be positive real numbers.
Assume that (1/r2 + (‖z/α‖)2)−1/2 ≥ ηε(Λ) for some ε < 1/2. Then the dis-
tribution of 〈z, v〉 + e where v ← DL+u,r and e ← Dα is within statistical
distance 4ε of Dβ for β =
√
(r‖z‖)2 + α2.
Lemma 2.4.3 ([GPV08], Lemma 3.1). For any ε > 0 and an n-dimensional
lattice Λ with basis matrix B, the smoothing parameter ηε(Λ) ≤ ‖B̃‖ ln(2n(1+
1/ε))/π where ‖B̃‖ denotes the length of the longest column vector of B̃ which
11
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is the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of B.
Lemma 2.4.4 ([Lyu12], Lemma 4.4). Tail Bounds of discrete Gaussians:
• For any k > 0, Pr [|z| > kσ; z ← Dσ] ≤ 2 exp(−k2/2).
• For any k > 1, Pr [‖z‖ > kσ
√
m; z← Dmσ ] < km exp(m−mk2/2).
2.5 Computational Problems
2.5.1 SVP
The Shortest Vector Problem(SVP) is one of well-known lattice problem.
The goal is to find a shortest non-zero lattice vector, given a basis of a lattice
Λ. An important variant is the Unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP). In
this problem, one knows in advance that λ2(Λ) > αλ1(Λ) for a fixed factor
α > 1 and is called α−uSVP. A detailed analysis with experiments about
uSVP is conducted by Albrecht et al. [AFG13]. They claimed that the attack




where τ is a constant depending on a lattice reduction algorithm used. They






from the Gaussian heuristic.
2.5.2 LWE and Its Variants
For integers n, q ≥ 1, a vector s ∈ Znq , and a distribution φ on R, let Aq,s,φ




Definition 2.5.1 (Learning with Errors (LWE)). For integers n, q ≥ 1, an
error distribution φ over R, and a distribution D over Znq , LWEn,q,φ(D), is to
distinguish (given arbitrarily many independent samples) the uniform distri-
bution over Tnq × T from Aq,s,φ with a fixed sample s← D.
We note that a search variant of LWE is the problem of recovering s
from (a, b) = (a, 〈a, s〉 + e) ∈ Tnq × T sampled according to Aq,s,φ, and these
are also equivalently defined on Znq × Zq rather than Tnq × T for discrete
(Gaussian) error distributions over Zq. Let LWEn,m,q,φ(D) denotes the case
when the number of samples are bounded by m ∈ N. We simply denote
LWEn,q,φ when the secret distribution D is U(Znq ). In many cases, φ is a
(discrete) Gaussian distribution so we simply denote by LWEn,m,q,s instead of
LWEn,m,q,φ. We remark that in the above definition, Aq,s,φ can be substituted
by the distribution over Znq×Zq for a distribution φ on Z by sampling a← Znq .
Clearly these two problems are equivalent.
Let z = Ats mod q ∈ Λq(A). The Search-LWE problem naturally can be
considered as a bounded distance decoding problem (BDD) in Λq(A) with
b = z + e mod q. If one can solve the BDD problem and recover z, then
finding s is easy.
We denote binLWE by the LWE problem whose secret vector is sampled
from uniform distribution over {0, 1}n. For a set Xn,ρ,θ which consists of
the vectors s ∈ Zn whose nonzero components are in {±1,±2,±4, · · · ,±ρ},
and the number of nonzero components is θ, we write spLWEn,m,q,s,ρ,θ as the
problem LWEn,m,q,s(U(Xn,ρ,θ)). We also consider a variant of LWE, LWEn,q,≤α,
in which the amount of noise is some unknown β ≤ α as in [BLP+13].
Similarly, spLWEn,q,≤α,ρ,θ can be defined by the same way.
2.6 Known Attacks for LWE
There are a number of known attacks for LWE. One of those attack was
introduced by Arora and Ge [AG11]. This attack is an algebraic attack, which
requires a lot of LWE samples to be applied. A combinatorial approach for
13
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solving LWE was introduced in [BKW03]. This attack is a generalization of
LPN solving algorithms, and is called BKW attack. It is known that the
algorithm also requires too many samples. Thus, commonly these attacks
are not considered for parameter selection.
Unlike these attacks, lattice based attacks are usually considered as prac-
tical attacks and used for parameter selections. One of a basic lattice based
approach is the distinguishing attack. In [LP11], a direct decoding attack is
also proposed, and showed that it is more powerful than the distinguishing
attack. several variants of the decoding attack, including the enumeration
attack are also proposed [LN13]. A embedding approach to reduce LWE to
the u-SVP is also investigated in [AFG13, BG14b] as mentioned in section
2.5.1.
2.6.1 The Distinguishing Attack
The goal of this attack is to distinguish whether the vector b sampled
from an LWE distribution or from the uniform distribution over Zmq , when
(A,b) is given. The attack first finds a small vector in the dual lattice
Λq(A)
⊥ = {v ∈ Zm|Av = 0 mod q}
. Then, it checks whether |〈v,b〉| is small or not. If b was sampled uniformly
random, 〈v,b〉 is uniformly random in Zq, thus the value is not small in
general. In case b comes from an LWE distribution, 〈v, b〉 = 〈e, b〉 is small
when v is small enough. A typical setting is that the distinguisher outputs
“LWE sample” if the absolute value of the inner product is smaller than
q/4, and “uniform sample” otherwise. The following lemma says that the
distinguishing advantage is bounded by exp(−π(‖v‖s/q)2) for any setting.
Lemma 2.6.1 ([LP11]). Given LWEn,m,q,s samples and a vector v of length
‖v‖ in the lattice L = {w ∈ Zmq : wTA ≡ 0 mod q}, the advantage of
distinguishing 〈v, e〉 from uniform random is close to exp(−π(‖v‖s/q)2).
14
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2.6.2 The Decoding Attack
A natural approach for LWE is that one solves a CVP derived from LWE
instances. More specifically, since b = As+e mod q, we get b = As+e+ qx
for some integer vector x ∈ Zm. Thus, by solving the CVP problem in the
lattice Λq(A) with target vector b, one can get the vector As + qx, and s.
The known algorithms to solve CVP are the nearest-plane algorithm in-
troduced by Babai [Bab86], its generalizations [LP11] or enumeration [LN13].
The performance of all these algorithms only depends on the error distribu-
tion of LWE. Therefore, we expect that there are no improved version of such
attacks for sparse secret variants.
15
Chapter 3
LWE with Sparse Secret,
spLWE
In this chapter, we show the theoratical hardness of spLWE via a security
reduction. This implies that spLWE is as hard as worst-case lattice problems.
For that, we provide a reduction from LWE to spLWE by generalizing the
techniques used in [BLP+13]. For concrete hardness, we also present modified
attacks for spLWE, which exploit the sparsity of secret vectors from all known
existing attacks for LWE and binLWE [BG14, BGPW16].
3.1 History
In 2005, Regev provide a quantum reduction from worst-case lattice prob-
lems to the average case problem, LWE in [Reg05]. In 2010, Goldwasser et
al. gave a reduction from the standard LWE to LWE with binary secret in
[GKPV10]. In 2013, a classical version of reductions for LWE are proved, and
the reduction for LWE with binary secret is more refined in [BLP+13]. The
worst case results for LWE with uniformly distributed error are also reported
in [MP13]. The reduction for LWE with uniformly distributed error requires
a restriction on the number of samples. On the other hand, the result for
binLWE has no limitation on the number of samples.
16
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The hardness of binLWE was proved to show robustness of the LWE in
terms of leakage-resilient cryptography in [GKPV10]. The main idea of the
reduction is that they substituted a uniformly random matrix A in binLWE
by many bunches of LWE samples. In other words, the binLWE samples
(A,As + e) is converted to (BC + Z,BCs + Zs + e) where A← Zm×nq , s←
{0, 1}n, e ← DmZ,σ,B ← Zm×lq ,C ← Zl×nq ,Z ← Dm×nZ,β . The latter component
BCs + Zs + e can be viewed as LWE samples from that Cs is uniform
random by the leftover hash lemma, and a small perturbation of the Gaussian
distribution Zs+e is close to another Gaussian one. Finally, (BC+Z,BCs+
Zs+e) is computationally indistinguishable from uniform random under the
standard LWE assumption and by standard hybrid lemma. This reduction
was improved in [BLP+13]. In this reduction, the standard deviation β is only
bounded by
√
10nσ. The refined reduction was introduced to show classical
hardness of LWE. That was accomplished by considering the part Zs + e in
continuous case.
3.2 Theoratical Hardness
As a prior work, we recall some definitions for variants of LWE and some
notion, which were introduced in [BLP+13] to show the reduction between
binLWE and LWE.
Definition 3.2.1 (“first-is-errorless” LWE). For integers n, q ≥ 1 and an
error distribution φ over R, the “first-is-errorless” variant of the LWE problem
is to distinguish between the following two scenarios. In the first, the first
sample is uniform over Tnq ×Tq and the rest are uniform over Tnq ×T. In the
second, there is an unknown uniformly distributed s ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}n, the
first sample we get is from Aq,s,{0} (where {0} denotes the distribution that
is deterministically zero) and the rest are from Aq,s,φ.
Definition 3.2.2 (extLWE). For integers n,m, q, t ≥ 1, a set X ⊆ Zm, and
a distribution χ over 1
q
Zm, the extLWEn,m,q,χ,X is as follows. The algorithm
gets to choose x ∈ X and then receives a tuple (A, (bi)i∈[t], (〈ei,x〉)i∈[t]) ∈
17
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Tn×mq × (Tmq )t × (1qZ)
t. Its goal is to distinguish between the following two
cases. In the first, A ∈ Tn×mq is chosen uniformly, ei ∈ 1qZ
m are chosen from
χ, and bi = A
T si+ei mod 1 where si ∈ {0, . . . , q−1}n are chosen uniformly.
The second case is identical, except that the bi are chosen uniformly in Tmq
independently of everything else.
Definition 3.2.3 (Quality of a set). A set X ⊂ Zm is said of quality ξ if
given any x ∈ X, we can efficiently find a unimodular matrix U ∈ Zm×m
such that if U ′ ∈ Zm×(m−1) is the matrix obtained from U by removing its
leftmost column then all of the columns of U ′ are orthogonal to z and its
largest singular value is at most ξ. It denoted by Qual(X).
We give a lemma to show a reduction to spLWE from the standard LWE in
section 4.1.
Lemma 3.2.1. The quality of a set X ⊆ {0,±1,±2, . . . ,±ρ}m, ρ = 2l is
bounded by 1 +
√
ρ.
Proof. Let x ∈ X and without loss of generality, we assume leftmost k com-
ponents of x are nonzero, remainings are zero, and |[x]i| ≤ |[x]i+1| for nonzero
components after reordering. We have [x]i+1 = ±2ti [x]i for some ti ≤ l. Now
consider the upper bidiagonal matrix U whose diagonal is all 1 and whose
diagonal above the main diagonal is y ∈ Zm−1 such that [x]i+1− [y]j[x]i = 0
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, and rightmost (m − k) components of y are 0. Since
[x]i+1 = ±2ti [x]i, it follows that [y]j is 2tj or −2tj . Then U is clearly unimod-
ular (det(U) = 1) and all the columns except the first one are orthogonal to
x. Moreover, by the triangle inequality, we can bound the norm (the largest
singular value) of U by the sum of that of the diagonal 1 matrix and the
off-diagonal matrix of which clearly have norm at most
√
ρ.
3.2.1 A Reduction from LWE to spLWE
To show our reduction for spLWE, we need extLWEm problem whose hard-
ness was proved in [BLP+13]. They showed that for a set X of quality ξ,
18
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n ≤ m) Based on a reduction from LWE to extLWE in [BLP+13], we prove
a reduction of spLWE as shown in the diagram below. Here, ω, γ and s are













Because Qual(Xn,ρ,θ) < 1+
√






is hard based on the hardness of LWEk,n,q,s. Following theorem shows that













· (2l + 2)θ
)















Qual(Xn,ρ,θ) ≤ ξ = 1 +
√
ρ, Adv < 33ε/2
Qual(Xn,ρ,θ) ≤ ξ = 1 +
√
ρ, Adv < m
Theorem 3.2.1. Let k, n, m, ρ = 2l, θ, q ∈ N, ε ∈ (0, 1/2), and δ, ω,β,γ > 0
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· (2l + 2)θ
)
≥ k log q + 2 log(1/δ).




An advantage of A for spLWEn,m,q,≤ω,ρ,θ(D) is bounded as follows:
Adv[A] ≤ 2Adv[C1] + Adv[C2] + 4mε+ δ
for the algorithms (distinguishers) of extLWEmk,n,q,β,Xn,ρ,θ , LWEk,m,q,γ, C1 and
C2 respectively.
Proof. The proof follows by a sequence of distribution to use hybrid argument
as stated in [BLP+13]. We take into account the following six distributions:
H0:= {(A,b = ATx + e) | A ← Tn×mq ,x ← Xn,ρ,θ, e ← Dmα′ for α′ =√
β2‖x‖2 + γ2 ≤ ρβ
√
2θ = ω}.
H1:={(A,ATx −NTx + ê mod 1) | A ← Tn×mq ,x ← X,N ← Dn×m1
q
Z,β , ê ←
Dmγ }.
H2:= {(qCTB + N, qBTCx + ê) | B ← Tk×mq ,C ← Tk×nq , x ← X,N ←
Dn×m1
q
Z,β , ê← D
m
γ }.
H3:= {(qCTB + N,BT s + ê) | s ← Zkq , B ← Tk×mq ,C ← Tk×nq , N ←
Dn×m1
q
Z,β , ê← D
m
γ }.
H4:= {(qCTB + N,u) | u← Tm, B← Tk×mq ,C← Tk×nq , N← Dn×m1
q
Z,β}.
H5:= {(A,u) | A← Tn×mq ,u← Tm}.
Let Bi be the distinguisher for the distributions between Hi and Hi+1
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 4. There are some efficient transformations from the distri-
butions (C,A,NTz), (C, Â,NTz) to H1, H2, from (B,B
T s + ê), (B,u) to
20
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H3, H4, and from (C, Â), (C,A) to H4, H5. In fact, the samples (C, Â,N
Tz),
(B,BT s+ ê), and (C, Â) are extLWEmk,n,q,β,X , LWEk,m,q,γ and extLWE
m
k,n,q,β,{0n}
samples respectively. The others are uniform distribution samples in the cor-
responding domain. It follows that Adv[B1], Adv[B3], Adv[B4] are bound by




Since ‖x‖ ≤ ρ
√
θ, and β ≥
√
2 ln(2n(1 + 1/ε))/π/q ≥
√
2ηε(Zn)/q from
lemma 2.4.3, it follows that the statistical distance between −NTx + ê and
Dmα′ is at most 4mε by lemma 2.4.2. This gives Adv[B0] ≤ 4mε. The last
Adv[B2] is bound by δ from the Leftover hash lemma. To sum up, Adv[A] ≤
2Adv[C1] +Adv[C2] + 4mε+ δ with trivial reduction to extLWEmk,n,q,β,{0n} from
extLWEmk,n,q,β,X .
3.3 Concrete Hardness
There exist many attacks for LWE including a dual attack and primal
attacks ([APS15, DM15]). Here, we exclude a combinatorial BKW algorithm,
the Arora and Ge algorithm and their variants, as they are not suitable in
our case ([ACF+14, AG11, DTV15, KF15, GJS15]). Since the analysis of
traditional dual attack is based on the (discrete) Gaussian error (and secret
in the LWE normal form), these traditional attacks are not directly applicable
to spLWE. Therefore, we modify those attacks to analyze concrete hardness
of spLWE. We also consider random guess on a sparse secret vector s.
3.3.1 Dual Attack (distinguish version)
Assume that we are given (A,b) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq and want to distinguish
whether they are uniform random samples or spLWE samples. For a constant
c ∈ R with c ≤ q, consider a lattice Lc(A) defined by
Lc(A) =
{
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If the samples (A,b) came from spLWE, for (x,y) ∈ Lc(A), we have
〈x,b〉 = 〈x,As + e〉
= 〈x,As〉+ 〈x, e〉
= c〈y, s〉+ 〈x, e〉 mod q
For a sufficiently small vector (v,w) ∈ Lc(A), the value 〈v,b〉 mod q be-
comes small when the samples are spLWE ones, and 〈v,b〉 mod q is uniformly
distributed when (A,b) came from the uniform distribution. Hence, one can
decide whether the samples came from spLWE distribution or uniform dis-
tribution from the size of 〈v,b〉 mod q with some success probability. We
now determine how small a vector (v,w) must be found as follows. First, we









is a basis matrix of Lc(A). Hence, we can figure out dim(Lc(A)) = m +
n and det(Lc(A)) = (q/c)
n.
Therefore, a lattice reduction algorithm with a root Hermite factor δ0
gives (v,w) ∈ Lc(A), such that
||(v,w)|| = δm+n0 (q/c)
n
m+n , (3.3.1)
and the length is minimized when m =
√
n(log q − log c)/ log δ0 − n.
Next, we consider the distribution of c〈w, s〉 + 〈v, e〉 mod q. Here, we
assume that the coefficients of sparse vector s are independently sampled
by (b1d1, b2d2, . . . , bndn) where di ← Ber(n, θ/n), bi ← {±1,±2,±4, . . . ,±ρ},
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and ρ = 2l for some l ∈ Z≥0. Since c〈w, s〉 is the sum of many indepen-
dent random variables, asymptotically it follows a Gaussian distribution with
mean 0, and variance (c||w||)2 · 2θ(4
l+1−1)
3n(2l+2)
. From that 〈v, e〉 follows a Gaus-
sian distribution with mean 0, variance (σ||v||)2, and lemma 2.6.1, we have
distinguishing advantage








From above equations 3.3.1, 3.3.2 with distinguishing advantage ε, we need




















3.3.2 Dual Attack (search version)
In this section, we assume the Geometric Series Assumption (GSA) on q-
ary lattices, introduced by Schnorr [Sch03], and this will be used to estimate
the length of last vector of BKZ 2.0 reduced basis. Let B = {b1, · · · ,bn} be
a basis for an n-dimensional lattice Λ, which is reduced by the BKZ 2.0 with
root Hermite factor δ0, then the GSA says:
‖b∗i ‖ = βi−1 · ‖b∗1‖ for some constant 0 < β ≤ 1,
where {b∗1, · · · ,b∗n} is the Gram-schmidt orthogonalization of {b1, · · · ,bn}.







βi−1 · ‖b∗1‖ = β
(n−1)n
2 · δn20 · det(B).
23
CHAPTER 3. LWE WITH SPARSE SECRET, SPLWE
From the equation above, it follows that β = δ
−2n2/(n−1)n
0 . Since BKZ reduced





µij · b∗j with |µij| ≤ 1/2, one can show that,





We now describe the dual attack against a small number of LWE instances
(A,As + e) = (A,b) ∈ Zm×n×Zm. For some constant c ∈ N with c ≤ q, we
consider a scaled lattice Λc(A).
Λc(A) = {(x,y/c) ∈ Zm × (Zn/c) : xA = y mod q}.
A dimension and determinant of the lattice Λc(A) is n+m and (q/c)
n respec-
tively. With the assumptions above, we can obtain vectors {(vi,wi)}1≤i≤n in
Λc(A) such that,













Clearly, the element (vi,wi) in Λc(A) satisfies
vi · b = vi · (A · s + e) = 〈c ·wi, s〉+ 〈vi, e〉 = 〈(vi,wi), (e, c · s)〉 mod q.
If, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (vi,wi) is short enough to satisfy ‖(vi,wi)‖·‖(e, c·s)‖ < q/2,
the above equation hold over Z. Then we can recover e and s by solving the
system of linear equations. Since, ‖(e, cs)‖ ≈
√
n · σ2 + c2 · ‖s‖2, condition










for constant 0 < c ≤ q. To find an optimized constant c, we assume m = n.
In this case, the size is optimized with c =
√
n · σ2/||s||2. Therefore, final
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condition to success attack is following:
2δ4n0 · σ · ‖s‖ ·
√
n < q(1− β2).
3.3.3 Modified Embedding Attack.
One can reduce the LWE problem to unique-SVP problem via Kannan’s
embedding technique. First, we consider a column lattice
Λq(A






The vector (1, e)T is in lattice Λq(A
′) and its size is approximately σ
√
m. If






find the vector (1, e)T via some lattice reduction algorithms. In particular, the







≥ τ · δm0 ,
where τ ≈ 0.4. For spLWE case, we can obtain a much larger gap than
that of the ordinary attack for LWE. We now consider a scaled lattice Λc(B)







for a constant 0 < c < 1. The vector (1, cs, e)T is in this lattice and its size
is approximately
√
























. Therefore, it is necessary to find the root Hermite factor δ0 such that:√
n+m
2πe
· (qmcn)1/n+m ≥ 0.4 · δn+m0 ·
√




2πe · (m · σ2 + c2‖s‖2)
· (qmcn)1/n+m ≥ 0.4 · δn+m0














≥ 0.4 · δn+m0
3.3.4 Improving Lattice Attacks for spLWE
A time complexity of all attacks suggested in this paper is heavily de-
pend on the dimension of lattices used in the attacks. Therefore, if one can
reduce the dimension of lattices, one can obtain a high advantage to solve the
LWE problem. In this section, we introduce two techniques to improve lattice-
based attacks for spLWE instances. The first thing is a method of ignoring
some components of a sparse secret and the other is a method of trading be-
tween dimension and modulus, which has been introduced in [BLP+13]. For
convenience, we denote T (m) as the expected time of solving m-dimensional
LWE.
Ignoring Components on Secret Vectors.
Most entries of a secret vector s are zero. Therefore, by ignoring some com-
ponents, one can reduce the dimension of LWE. More precisely, we delete k
26
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entries of secret vector s and its corresponding column of A. For convenience,
we denote it as s′ and A′, respectively. If the deleted components of s are
zero, the following equation also hold:
A · s + e = A′ · s′ + e mod q.











that one can reduce the n-dimensional LWE to (n−k)-dimensional LWE with
probability Pk. In other words, solving 1/Pk instances in (n−k)-dimensional
LWE, one can expect to solve the n dimension LWE. Hence, in order to guar-
antee λ bits security, it gives:
T (n− k)/Pk ≥ 2λ. (3.3.3)
Modulus Dimension Switching.
In [BLP+13], they describe a modulus dimension switching technique for
LWE instances. Using the corollary 3.4 in [BLP+13], for n, q, θ, w that divides
n and ε ∈ (0, 1/2), one can reduce a LWEn,q,≤α instances to LWEn/w,qw,≤β in-
stances, where β is a constant satisfying β2 ≥ α2 + (4/π) ln(2n(1 + 1/ε)) ·
θ/q2 ≈ α2. Along this reduction, a secret vector s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn) of
spLWEn,q,≤α,ρ,θ is changed to s
′′ = (s1 + qs2 + · · · + qw−1sw, · · · , sn−w+1 +
· · ·+ qw−1sn) of spLWEn/w,qw,≤β,ρ′,θ′ . Hence, if one can recover the s′′ by solv-
ing LWEn/w,qw,≤β,ρ′,θ′ instances, one can also reveal the vector s. Let t be the
number of a set W = {swi|swi 6= 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n/w} and P ′w be the probability







) . When t is not zero, the expected size of
‖s′′‖ is
√
tqw. In that case, applying the attacks in section 4.2, 6.1 and 6.2 to
converted n/w-dimensional LWE instances is not a good approach to obtain
higher the advantage. Hence, we only consider the case t = 0. We can obtain
the following conditions to get λ-bit security:
T (n/w)/P ′w ≥ 2λ. (3.3.4)
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By combining the ignoring k components with modulus dimension switch-
ing techniques, we can reach the final condition to obtain the λ-bit security:





In this chapter, we briefly review the previous LWE-based public key en-
cryptions, which have IND-CPA security. In terms of design principle, all of
them are similar. Therefore, we try to give a alteration on the base problem
and choose a different construction strategy. In particular, we propose an
efficient instantiation of a PKE scheme based on spLWE. We first construct
an IND-CPA PKE and convert it to an IND-CCA scheme in the quantum
random oracle model by applying a modified Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion of
Unruh. Our implementation shows that the 256-bit IND-CCA scheme takes
313 µ seconds and 302 µ seconds respectively for encryption and decryption
with the parameters that have 128-bit quantum security.
4.1 History
The LWE-based public-key encryption scheme which is mostly related ours
is introduced by Regev [Reg05]. This encryption scheme uses LWE dimension
n, modulus q, width s, and number of samples m as parameters and can be
described as follows:
• The secret key vector s ∈ Znq is sampled randomly from Znq ,and the
29
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public key is m samples of LWE, (A,b) ∈ Zm×nq ×Zmq where b = As+e
• In order to encrypt a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} using the public key A, one chooses
a uniformly random vector x ∈ {0, 1}m and outputs the ciphertext as
c = (c1, c2) = (x
TA, 〈x,b〉+ bq/2cµ).
• For decryptions with the secret key s, one computes c2 − 〈c1, s〉 =
bq/2cµ+ 〈x, e〉, and checks whether it is closer to 0 or to q/2.
The above encryption is information-theoretically secure for sufficiently
large m by the well-known Left-over Hash lemma, and the decryption is
correct as long as the size of decryption error 〈e,x〉 is less than q/4. It requires
the modulus q to be large enough relative to the magnitude of decryption
error. It is known that one can choose parameters s = Θ(
√
n) and q = Õ(n),
which correspond to the error rate of α = s/q = 1/Õ(
√
n) and worst-case
approximation factors of γ = Õ(n3/2) in order to secure under a worst-case
assumption.
A dual version of LWE-based encryption scheme was proposed by Gen-
try, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [GPV08]. Unlike the Regev’s encryption
scheme, the public keys are subset-sum instances and the ciphertexts are
LWE instances. Thus, a public keys has many possible secret keys, and this is
useful for constructing a variety of more advanced cryptosystems including
IBE.
In 2011, a more compact LWE-based encryption scheme was proposed
by Lindner and Peikert [LP11] with concrete parameters which are derived
from a new decoding attack for LWE. In this encryption scheme, public keys,
and ciphertexts are LWE instances. Unlike the encryptions mentioned above,
it only relies on computational arguments, the LWE assumption, and does
not require the statistical lemma. As a result, the keys and ciphertexts are
smaller than those in the above LWE-based schemes by a factor of about log
q.
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4.2 spLWE-based Instantiations
In this section, we describe a public-key encryption scheme whose security
is based on spLWE. One of advatages of our scheme is that the ciphertext
size is smaller than those of the previous works [Reg05, LP11]. We also use
a noisy subset sum in our encryption algorithm which is proposed in the
previous LWE-based encryption scheme [LP11], but our message encoding
method is different: we first construct a KEM(key encapsulation mechanism)
based on spLWE, and conceal messages as a OTP manner with an ephemeral
key shared by the KEM.
We propose two versions of our encryption scheme based on the spLWE-
based KEM, where one is IND-CPA secure and the other is an IND-CCA
secure under the conversion proposed in [TU15]. We note that these different
types of schemes can be applied to various circumstances.
4.2.1 Our Key Encapsulation Mechanism
We use a reconciliation technique in [Pei14] which is the main tool to
construct our spLWE-based KEM. In our KEM, the sender generates a random
number v ∈ Z2q for some even integer q > 0, and sends 〈v〉2 where 〈v〉2 :=
[b2
q
·vc]2 ∈ Z2 to share bve2 := [b1q ·ve]2 ∈ Z2 securely. For all vectors v ∈ Z
k
2q,
〈v〉2 and bve2 are naturally defined by applying 〈〉2 and be2 component-
wise, respectively. The receiver recovers bve2 from 〈v〉2 and sk using a special
function named rec. The reconciliation function rec is defined as follows.
Definition 4.2.1. For disjoint intervals I0 :=
{






















∩ Z, we define
rec : Z2q × Z2 → Z2 where rec(w, b) :=
0 if w ∈ Ib + E mod 2q,1 otherwise.
It is naturally extended to a vector-input function rec : Zk2q × Zk2 → Zk2 by
applying rec component-wise.
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The following lemmas show that 〈v〉2 reveals no information about bve2,
and rec decapsulates bve2 correctly when it is provided with a proper ap-
proximation of v.
Lemma 4.2.1. If v ∈ Z2q is uniformly random, then bve2 is uniformly ran-
dom given 〈v〉2.
Proof. Suppose that 〈v〉2 = b ∈ Z2. It implies that v is uniform over Ib∪ (q+
Ib). If v ∈ Ib, then bve2 = 0, and if v ∈ (q + Ib), then bve2 = 1. Therefore
bve2 is uniformly random over {0, 1} given 〈v〉2.
Lemma 4.2.2. For v, w ∈ Z2q, if |v − w| < q/4, then rec(w, 〈v〉2) = bve2.
Proof. Let 〈v〉2 = b ∈ Z2, then v ∈ Ib ∪ (q+ Ib). Then bve2 = 0 if and only if
v ∈ Ib. Since (Ib +E)−E = Ib + (− q2 ,
q
2
) and (q + Ib) are disjoint (mod 2q),
we know that v ∈ Ib if and only if w ∈ Ib + E.
The purpose of our KEM is sharing the ephemeral key from uTAs+ error
and the reconciliation function between two parties as in [Pei14]. Here, we
describe our spLWE-based KEM for k-bit sharing as follows.
• KEM.Params(λ): generate a bit-length of shared key k, a bit-length of
seed y and spLWE parameters n,m, q, s, ρ, θ, s′, ρ′, θ′ with λ-bit security.
Publish all parameters by pp.
• KEM.Keygen(pp): sample seedA ← {0, 1}y,A ← Gen(seedA),E ←
Dm×kZ,s and S ← U(Xn,ρ,θ)k, and compute B = AS + E ∈ Zm×kq . For a
secret key sk = S, publish a corresponding public key pk = (seedA,B).
• KEM.Encap(pk,pp): sample u ← Xm,ρ′,θ′ , (e1, e2) ← DkZ,s′ × DnZ,s′ and
e3 ∈ {0, 1}k. Let v = uTB + e1 ∈ Zkq and v̄ = 2v + e3 ∈ Zk2q. Compute
c1 = 〈v̄〉2 ∈ Zk2 and c2 = uTA + e2 ∈ Znq from A ← Gen(seedA).
Send a ciphertext c = (c1, c2) ∈ Zk2 × Znq to the receiver, and store an
ephemeral secret key µ = bv̄e2 ∈ Zk2.
• KEM.Decap(c, sk): If q is odd, compute w = 2c2TS ∈ Zkq , and ouput
µ = rec(w, c1).
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We would like to note that if q is even, the doubling process in the en-
capsulation phase, i.e. converting v = uTB + e1 to v̄ = 2v + e3, is not
required.
4.2.2 Our KEM-Based Encryption Scheme
We now construct a public key encryption scheme based on the spLWE-
based KEM in the previous section. When the message slot increases by one,
the ciphertext spaces of our scheme grow only one or two bits, which is more
efficient than the known LWE based encryption schemes [Reg05], [LP11],
where the growth is about log q bits.
PKE1 (IND-CPA) :
With a key exchange mechanism which shares a `-bit length key, it is
well-known that one can convert it into a public key encryption of the `-
bit length message having the same security as the key exchange mechanism.
This conversion only includes XOR operations after generating an ephemeral
key. Note that the ciphertext space is given as Znq ×Z2`2 , which is very efficient
than Zn+`q , ciphertext spaces of other LWE-based scehems.
PKE1 is described as follows.
• PKE1.Params(λ): let ` be a message length, and run KEM.Params(λ)
with k = `. Publish all parameters by pp.
• PKE1.Keygen(pp): output a key pair (pk, sk)← KEM.Keygen(pp).
• PKE1.Enc(pk,m, pp): for c, µ← KEM.Encap(pk,pp), let c′ = m⊕µ and
output a ciphertext (c, c′).
• PKE1.Dec((c, c′), sk): for µ = KEM.Decap(c, sk), output m = c′ ⊕ µ.
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PKE2 (IND-CCA) :
We can apply the transformation suggested in [TU15], which can improve
security of the existing public key encryption schemes. As a trade-off of secu-
rity, this scheme requires a more complex construction than PKE1, but note
that this also use light operations such as XOR or hashing, which are not
serious tasks for implementation.
We specially denote the encryption phase of PKE1 by PKE1.Enc(pk,m, pp; r)
to emphasize that a random bit-string r is used for random sampling. Here,
PKE1.Enc(pk,m, pp; r) becomes deterministic.
It also requires quantumly secure hash functionsG : {0, 1}k1+` → {0, 1}∗, H :
{0, 1}k1 → {0, 1}k2 and H ′ : {0, 1}k1 → {0, 1}k3 , where ki will be de-
termined later. With these parameters, our scheme has a ciphertext space
Znq ×Z
k1+k2+k3+`
2 , which also gradually increases with the growth of message
slot.
PKE2 is described as follows.
• PKE2.Params(λ): let ` be a message length and ki > 0 be integers such
that hash functions G : {0, 1}k1+` → {0, 1}∗, H : {0, 1}k1 → {0, 1}k2
and H ′ : {0, 1}k1 → {0, 1}k3 have λ-bit security. Let pp be an output of
KEM.Params(λ) with k = k1. Publish `, pp and ki.
• PKE2.Keygen(pp): output a key pair (pk, sk)← KEM.Keygen(k1).
• PKE2.Enc(pk,m, pp, ki): randomly choose ω ← {0, 1}k1 , and let cm =
H(ω)⊕m. Compute ch = H ′(ω) and (c, c′)← PKE1.Enc(pk, ω;G(ω||cm)).
Output a ciphertext (c, c′, ch, cm).
• PKE2.Dec((c, c′, ch, cm), sk, pp, ki): compute ω = PKE1.Dec((c, c′), sk)
and m = H(ω)⊕cm. Check whether (c, c′) = PKE1.Enc(pk, ω;G(w||cm))
and ch = H
′(ω). If so, output m, otherwise output ⊥ .
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4.2.3 Security
In this section, we show (IND-CPA, IND-CCA) security of our encryp-
tion scheme (PKE1, PKE2). Security of our encryption scheme is reduced to
security of KEM and security of KEM comes from hardness of spLWE. Conse-
quently, under the hardness of spLWE, PKE1 can reach to IND-CPA security
and PKE2 achieves further quantumly IND-CCA security with the random
oracle assumption. Here is a statement for security of KEM.
Theorem 4.2.1. Under the spLWEn,m,q,s,ρ,θ, and spLWEn,m,q,s′,ρ′,θ′ assump-
tion, our KEM is IND-CPA secure.
Proof. (Sketch) By Lemma 3, one cannot extract any information about
µ = bve2 with c1. Moreover, even if one can know some information of v,
the distribution of (c2,v) can be regarded as LWE instances as :
(c2,v) = (u
T ·A + e2,uT ·B + e1) = (C,C · S + e′)
for C = uT ·A + e2 and for some e′. Thus, hardness of spLWE insures that
the distribution of (c2,v) is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution
over Znq × Zkq .
We refer [Pei14] for the detailed IND-CPA game-based proof, where the
only difference is that we assume the hardness of spLWE, not RLWE.
It is well-known in many cryptographic texts that PKE1 has the same se-
curity level with KEM. Hence, security of PKE1 has been demonstrated from
the previous theorem. Moreover, the transformation of [TU15] gives quan-
tumly IND-CCA security for PKE2, when it is converted from an IND-CPA
secure PKE with random oracle modeled hashes. When the aforementioned
statements are put together, we can establish the following security theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2. Assuming the hardness of spLWEn,m,q,s,ρ,θ, spLWEn,m,q,s′,ρ′,θ′,
PKE1 is IND-CPA secure, and PKE2 is quantumly IND-CCA secure with
further assumption that the function G,H and H ′ are modeled as random
oracles.
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Proof. (Sketch) We only need to show that PKE2 is IND-CCA secure. The
transformation of [TU15] actually make an IND-CCA secure public key en-
cryption from a public key encryption which is well-spread and one-way, and
we briefly explain why (IND-CPA) PKE1 is well-spread and one-way.
• Well-spreadness: Note that a ciphertext of PKE1 is of the form
(c1, c2) =
(
〈2(uTB + e1) + e3〉2,uTA+ e2
)
,
where u ← Xm,ρ′,θ′ , (e1, e2) ← DkZ,s′ ×DnZ,s′ . From hardness of spLWE,
distributions of uTB+e1 ∈ Zkq and uTA+e2 ∈ Znq are statistically close
to uniform distributions over Zkq and Znq , and then PKE1 is well-spread.
• One-wayness: With an oracle O finding m from PKE1.Enc(pk,m) for
any pk with probability ε, an adversary equipped with O wins the




PKE1.Enc(pk,mb), the adversary outputs the answer of O. It can be




Similar to the security case, correctness of our (IND-CPA, IND-CCA)
encryption scheme is dependent on that of our spLWE-based KEM. We remark
that generally, one can obtain some correctness condition for all LWE variants
by examining a bound of error term in the proof below. Here, we assume
s = s′, ρ = ρ′ and θ = θ′, which is used for our parameter instantiation.
Theorem 4.2.3. Let n,m, σ, ρ, θ be parameters in spLWEn,m,q,σ,ρ,θ, and ` be
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Proof. As shown in the description of KEM.Decap, the ephemeral key is de-
capsulated correctly if |v̄ − w| < q/4 by lemma 4.2.2. Since v̄ = 2uTAS +
2uTE + 2e1 + e3, and w = 2u
TAS + 2e2S, it is rephrased by
|2uT · E− 2e1 · S + 2e2 + e3| < q/4,
which is equivalent to
|2〈u, [E]j〉+ 2〈−e1, [S]j〉+ 2[e2]j + [e3]j| < q/4, 1 ≤ j ≤ `
where u← Xm,ρ′,θ′ , [S]j ← Xn,ρ,θ, [E]j ← DmZ,s, e1 ← DnZ,s′ , [e2]j ← DZ,s′ , [e3]j ←
{0, 1}. For simplicity, we ignore the small term 2[e2]j + [e3]j. (This is com-
pensated in our final choice of parameters.) By applying lemma 5.3.1 to a
(m + n) dimensional vector x = (u, [S]j) and the bound Ts‖x‖ = q/8, we
came to have per-symbol error probability γ,









. From the equation above, we get the bound on q as the
statement.
4.3 Implementation
We have suggested concrete parameters for both classical and quantum
security, implementation results of our scheme and a comparison table with
the previous LWE-based PKE [LP11] and RLWE-based PKE [LPR10]. In 128-
quantum bit security, the IND-CPA version of our encryption took about
314µs and the IND-CCA version of our encryption takes 313µs for 256-bit
messages on Macbook Pro with CPU 2.6GHz Intel Core i5 without paral-
lelization.
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4.3.1 Parameter Selection
In order to deduce appropriate parameters, we assume that the best
known classical and quantum sieving algorithm in dimension k runs in time
20.292k and 20.265k respectively [BDGL16, Laa15]. The BKZ 2.0 lattice basis
reduction algorithm gives the root Hermite factor δ0 ≈ ( k2πe(πk)
1/k)1/2(k−1)




We also consider a direct CVP attack by sieving [Laa16], modified dual
(distinguish) and embedding attack. Moreover, since our secret key is a sparse
vector, our attack can be improved if one can guess some components of secret
to be zero. After that, we can apply the attack to a smaller dimensional spLWE
instances. We denote the probability of the correct guessing t components











To sum up, the parameters must satisfy the followings for the classical
and quantum security:












(θ!)(n−θ!) (For classical security, 2λ becomes λ)
• Let T (n, q, θ, s, l) be a BKZ 2.0 running time to get root Hermite factor
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For classical security, 0.265 becomes 0.292.




ln(2/γ) by the Lemma 4.2.2.
• The parameters k1 and k2 are a symmetric key length of XOR opera-
tions, and k3 is a length of hash value. For λ-bit security, it is known
that k1 and k2 should be λ (2λ) and k3 should be 2λ (3λ) in classical
(quantum) security model.
4.3.2 Implementation Result
We use C++ on a Linux-based system, with GCC compiler and apply
the Eigen library (www.eigen.tuxfamily.org), which makes vector and matrix
operations fast. To sample u efficiently in our encryption algorithm, we as-
sume that there are only one non-zero element in each n/θ-size block. To
follow the previous reduction and security proof, we need a sampling of dis-
crete Gaussian distribution when we generate error vectors in key generation
and encryption algorithm. We use box-muller transformation to generate dis-
cretized Gaussian distribution. In the case below, message space length is
32-byte and secret key is ternary vector. We used PC (Macbook Pro) with
CPU 2.6GHz Intel Core i5 without parallelization.
Parameters IND-CPA IND-CCA
λ n q s θ Setup(ms) Enc(µs) Dec(µs) Cptx(byte) Enc(µs) Dec(µs) Cptx(byte)
72 300 382 5 27 9.8 96 41 401 116 130 435
96 400 441 5 36 16.3 167 62 513 181 182 548
128 565 477 5 42 29.3 273 102 700 291 282 733
Table 4.1: Implementation result in classical hardness with 256 bit message
Parameters IND-CPA IND-CCA
λ n q s θ Setup(ms) Enc(µs) Dec(µs) Cptx(byte) Enc(µs) Dec(µs) Cptx(byte)
72 300 410 5 31 9.8 96 41 401 108 130 435
96 400 477 5 42 16.0 163 56 514 186 191 548
128 565 520 5 50 129.5 314 106 770 313 302 804
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Table 4.2: Implementation result in quantum hardness with 256 bit message
We also compare our implemetation with software implementation in
[GFS+12], which implements LWE-based PKE [LP11] and Ring version PKE
[LPR10, LPR13]. Their implementation is executed on an Intel Core 2 Duo
CPU running at 3.00 GHz PC. Parameters in each rows are secure in same
security parameters.
Our scheme [GFS+12] LWE RLWE
(n, q, s, θ) Enc Dec (n, q, s) Enc Dec Enc Dec
(150, 285, 5.0, 15) 0.027 0.011 (128, 2053, 6.77) 3.01 1.24 0.76 0.28
(300, 396, 5.0, 29) 0.063 0.019 (256, 4093, 8.87) 11.01 2.37 1.52 0.57
(400, 545, 5.0, 55) 0.109 0.026 (384, 4093, 8.35) 23.41 3.41 2.51 0.98
(560, 570, 5.0, 60) 0.223 0.04 (512, 4093, 8.0) 46.05 4.52 3.06 1.18
Table 4.3: Our scheme vs. LWE vs. RLWE: Time in milliseconds for encryp-
tion and decryption for a 16-byte plaintext.
The table above shows that our PKE scheme is about 20 times faster
than RLWE-based PKE scheme in [LPR10, LPR13]. The sparsity of secret






In this chapter, we propose a new post-quantum commitment scheme
which can commit to arbitrary vectors over Zq. Our scheme satisfies compu-
tational hiding and perfect binding properties under spLWE-assumption. To
the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first LWE-based commitment
scheme where the message space does not restricted to any subspace. We
show that our commitment scheme is efficient when used as a subblock of
zero-knowledge proof of opening information of commitments. We also con-
struct zero-knowledge proofs which can prove some relations among those
commitments. All of theses allow us to make known LWE-based threshold
cryptosystems actively secure. In particular, we suggest a efficient thresh-
old version of LWE-based PKE, [CHK+16], which achieves active security in
random oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first actively
secure LWE-based threshold cryptosystem which has no additional assump-
tion like DL, RLWE problem, and has no restriction on threshold conditions.
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5.1 History
Commitment schemes [Blu82] are basic building blocks in designs of cryp-
tographic protocols and have a lot of applications including a classical ap-
plication, coin flipping over telephone. Intuitively, they can be described as
a electronic version of lockable box. When used to commit to some value in
zero-knowledge proofs, they can enforce regular behavior of corrupted parties.
As a result, it is possible to make protocols secure against active attackers.
Prime examples of these are threshold signatures and threshold decryption.
In threshold decryption, the decryption key of a original public-key encryp-
tion scheme is split to N shares and then distributed to N servers, so that
any t servers can decrypt collaborately. By giving suitable proofs for partial
decryption via some NIZKs, malicious behaviors of partial decryption servers
can be detected. This prevents outputing of unusual decryption results. In
other words, it guarantees robustness property.
In context of lattice based cryptography, the first LWE-based threshold
cryptosystem, a threshold version of Regev’s PKE [Reg09], was given in
[BD10]. After then threshold versions of PKE and FHE’s were proposed
for various purpose including Multi-Party Computation (MPC), electronic
votes [MSS11, XXZ11, AJLA+12, MW16]. (See [BGGK17] for more details)
A limitation of these threshold PKE’s, and FHE’s is that they only achieve
passive or semi-honest security.(c.f. One can achieve active security without
additional tools by adjusting the threshold with Shamir’s secret sharing as
in [BD10]). In this background, we construct LWE-based NIZKs in order
to enforce robustness on LWE-based cryptosystems as well as homomorphic
cryptosystems. For efficiency reason, we construct them in random oracle
model by transforming interactive zero-knowledge proofs via the well-known
technique ’Fiat-Shamir Heuristic’ [FS86].
In order to construct zero-knowledge proofs that checks each server per-
forms decryption correctly, it is essential to consider commitment schemes
which can commit arbitrary vectors over Zq. There are several related works
in lattice-based cryptography: A commitment scheme based on SIS problem
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was introduced in [KTX08], and an ring variant of the scheme was suggested
in [Xag10]. However, the message space is restricted to a binary space. The
LWE-based commitment scheme [ZTH10] is also the case. Thereafter, Jain
et al. also proposed a bit commitment scheme whose security is based on
the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem, and zero-knowledge proofs
to prove general relations. A RLWE version of the scheme in [JKPT12] was
introduced in [XXW13, BCK+14]. The soundness error of all related zero-
knowledge proofs achieve a non-negligible soundness error. This cause many
parallel repetitions in order to get negligible soundness error. However, an
improved RLWE-based commitment scheme which is perfectly binding and
computationally hiding, and corresponding zero-knowledge protocols were
proposed in [BKLP15]. The message space is a vector space over Zq, and
they gave zero-knowledge proofs with negligible soundness error. On the
other hand, Ring-SIS-based commitment and related zero knowledge pro-
tocols were suggested in [BDOP16].
Therefore, in post-quantum sense, we can only exploit RLWE or Ring-SIS
based commitments and the related zero-knowledge proofs for actively secure
threshold cryptosystems. This enforces assuming the hardness of ring variant
problems even the underlying cryptosystems are based on hard problems over
generic lattices, not ideal lattices like LWE, SIS. In this thesis, we suggest
commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs based on LWE for actively
secure LWE-based threshold cryptosystems. In particular, we use spLWE that
is a variant of LWE with sparse secret vectors in order to improve their
efficiency.
5.2 spLWE-based Instantiations
We first consider a LWE-based commitment scheme which is analogous
to the one in [JKPT12]. Informally, for dimension n, the number of samples
m, and modulus q, the commitment with message space Zlq is in the form
Am+Br+e mod q, where (A,B) ∈ Zm×lq ×Zm×nq is a public random matrix,
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r ∈ Znq is a uniformly random vector, and e ∈ Zmq is a short error vector.
This commitment scheme is computationally hiding under LWE assumption.
In particular, the distribution of Br + e mod q is statistically close to the
uniform, and random distribution. Thus, it can hide message information.
The scheme is perfect binding. This property follows from that A(m−m′)+
B(r − r′) = e − e′ mod q does not hold overwhelmingly for sufficiently
large q and m, since ‖e − e′‖ is small. Here, the probability that the above
equation holds only depends on the cardinalities of message and randomness
domains under the consideration of union bounds. Thus, using of relatively
small dimensions l, n and small vectors r’s rather than arbitrary vectors
over Znq leads to more efficient instantiations of the LWE-based commitment
scheme. In this background, spLWE is a suitable hard problem for efficient
instantiations.
5.2.1 Our spLWE-based Commitments
In this section, we propose a new spLWE-based commitment scheme,
which is closely related to zero-knowledge proofs. The setup algorithm chooses
a spLWE dimension n, the number of sample m, a weight θ, a bound of non-
zero coefficient ρ, a prime modulus q, a message space rank l, and a bound
of elements in a challenge set β, and set width parameters s1, s2, s3, and
rejection sampling parameters α1, α2. The commitment algorithm computes
the commitment vector c with public random matrices A,B and randomness
vectors r, e. The verification algorithm checks if the commitment computed
from opening informations (m′, r′, e′, f ′) is indeed the commitment c, and the
norm of randomness vector used in the commitment c is sufficiently small.
Finally our commitment scheme is described as follows:
• Setup(1κ, 1k): Set parameters n,m, q, l, θ, ρ, β ∈ N and s1, s2, s3 ∈ R
with 2κ, 2k-bit security where s2 = α2βρ
√
2πθ, s3 = 2α3s1β
√
m for
some α1, α2 ∈ R≥1 and q is prime. Sample seedA ← {0, 1}y1 , seedB ←
{0, 1}y2 . The public commitment key pk is (seedA, seedB).
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• Com(m ∈ Znq ): Generate random matrices A ← Gen(seedA),B ←
Gen(seedB) where (A,B) ∈ Zm×lq × Zm×nq and sample r ← Xn,ρ,θ,
e← DmZ,s1 , compute
c = Com(m, r, e) = Am + Br + e mod q
.
• Ver(c, (m′, r′, e′, f ′)): Given a commitment c with a opening infomation
(m, r, e, f), the verifier accepts if and only if Am′+B(f ′−1r′)+f ′−1e′ =
c, ‖r′‖∞ ≤ 24s2/
√
2π, ‖e′‖∞ ≤ 24s3/
√
2π, |f ′| ≤ β.
We would like note that honest committer can open his commitment by
setting as f ′ = 1, r′ = r, e′ = e. Here, we also relax the verification condition
in order to prove soundness property of our related zero-knowledge proto-
cols. The distribution of e, DmZ,s1 , is not bounded, but we set that the norm
of e is bounded with overwhelming probability. This leads to correctness of
our scheme. As mentioned above, our commitment scheme satisfies compu-
tational hiding property under spLWE assumption. The following theorem
shows that the commitment scheme satisfies statistical binding property.
Theorem 5.2.1. Let m = kn with k > 2, l = n and β ≤ 2n4−1− 1
2
. Assuming
the hardness of spLWEn,m,q,s1,ρ,θ with the following condition
log q ≥ 2
k − 1
log(24σ2 + 1) +
2k
k − 1
log(24σ3 + 1) + 1,
the above commitment scheme is correct and satisfies the computational
hiding and statistical binding properties.
Proof. We prove correctness, computational hiding and statistical binding
properties in this order.
Correctness: This is obvious since ‖r‖∞ ≤ ρ < s2 < 24s2/
√
2π for r← Xn,ρ,θ,
‖e‖∞ ≤ 12s1/
√
2π with probability 1− 2−100 for e← DmZ,s1 , which is strictly
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2π and f ′ = 1 ≤ β.
Computational hiding: Under the spLWEn,m,q,s1,ρ,θ-assumption, Br+e mod q
is pseudo-random, thus Am + Br + e mod q is also pseudo-random.
Statistical binding: Let c be a commitment with two opening infomations
(m, r, e, f), (m′, r′, e′, f ′) where m 6= m′. Then
Am + B(f−1r) + f−1e = c = Am′ + B(f ′−1r′) + f ′−1e′ mod q
and so
A(m−m′) + B(f−1r− f ′−1r′) = f ′−1e′ − f−1e mod q.
Let m′′ = m−m′ 6= 0. Now, we have that




By taking union bound over all m′′, r, r′, e, e′, f, f ′, we have the overall prob-












for some constant 1 < c ≤ 2 or equivalently,
log c+ 2 log(24σ2 + 1) +
2m
n
log(24σ3 + 1) +
2
n
log(2β + 1) ≤ m− l
n
log q,
and log c+ 2
n
log(2β+1) ≤ 1 under the conditions in the Theorem. Therefore,
the overall probability is c−n, which is negligible in n.
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5.2.2 Proof for Opening Information
In order to prove zero-knowledgeness of protocols, it is essential that one
can construct a simulator that statistically simulates the accepting tran-
scripts. The following lemmas will be exploited for these purposes.
Lemma 5.2.1 ([Lyu12] Theorem 4.9, Rejection Sampling). Let n, T ∈ N be
natural numbers and U ⊆ Zn, such that all elements in U have norm less than
T . Let further D : U → R be a probability distribution and σ ∈ ω(T
√
log n).
Then there exists a constant M ∈ O(1) such that the output distributions of
the algorithms A1, A2 where




• A2 : draw v← D, z← Dnσ and output (z,v) with probability 1M .
have at most statistical distance 2 − ω(log n)/M . In particular A1 outputs
something with probability at least 1− 2−ω(logn)/M . For a concrete instantia-
tion σ = αT for α ∈ R>0, we have M = exp(12/α+1/(2α2)) and the outputs
of A1 and A2 are within statistical distance 2
−100/M .
Intuitively, the rejection sampling lemma says that some small translation
of a discrete Gaussian distribution with sufficiently large standard deviation
can be hidden by rejecting the sampling with a certain policy.
We now describe our zero-knowledge proofs. Let c = Am+Br+e mod q
be a commitment that is published by the prover. The prover can prove
that he knows a valid opening information of c from the following protocol
without revealing secret information. The public input is c and the private
input is (m, r, e):




sends t to V.
• V sends a random integer d ∈ [−β, β] ∩ Z.
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• P checks d ∈ [−β, β] ∩ Z, and computes sm = µ+ dm mod q, sr = ρ+
dr mod q, se = η+de mod q. If d = 0, P sends sm, sr, se to V. Otherwise,










(η), and ⊥ with probability 1− p.
• V accepts iff t + dc = Asm + Bsr + se mod q, ‖sr‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and
‖se‖∞ ≤ 12σ3.
We now prove that the above protocol is indeed a zero-knowledge proof.





overwhelmingly for the relations:
Proof. We prove the protocol satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: The verifier accepts with overwhelming probability if the






• Special Soundness: Given a commitment c and a pair of accepting tran-






e)) where d 6= d′, we can extract
a vaild opening information of c.
• Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Transcripts of the protocol with an
honest verifier can be simulated with computationally indistinguishable
distribution.
Completeness: When d = 0, P sends sm = µ, sr = ρ, se = η to V. Thus




‖sr‖∞ = ‖ρ‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and ‖se‖∞ = ‖η‖∞ ≤ 12σ3 with overwhelming
probability by lemma 5.3.1.
In the case d 6= 0, P sends sm = µ+dm, sr = ρ+dr, se = η+de to V with
probability close to 1
M2M3
overwhelmingly by the rejection sampling lemma.
Thus Asm + Bsr + se = Aµ+ Bρ+ η+ d(Am + Br + e) = t + dc. Note that
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respectively by the rejection sampling lemma. Hence, ‖sr‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and
‖se‖∞ ≤ 12σ3 with overwhelming probability by lemma 5.3.1. Therefore, V





Special Soundness: Suppose two accepting transcripts (t, d, (sm, sr, se)),




e)) where d 6= d′ are given. Then the following equations are
hold:
t + dc = Asm + Bsr + se mod q





By subtracting the above equations, we get:
(d− d′)c = A(sm − s′m) + B(sr − s′r) + (se − s′e) mod q
In other words, we have a witness ((d − d′)−1(sm − s′m), (sr − s′r), (se −
s′e), d − d′) for (A,B, c) such that ‖sr − s′r‖∞ ≤ 24σ2, and ‖se − s′e‖∞ ≤
24σ3. Note that the binding property of the commitment scheme implies
(d− d′)−1(sm − s′m) = m.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Let c and challenge d are given as in-
puts. First, the simulator samples s′m ← Zlq, s′r ← Dnσ2 , and s
′
e ← Dmσ3 , and




e − dc. In the case d = 0, the simulator out-




e)). This is statistically indistinguishable from accepting





is statistically indistinguishable from the the distribution of real response





and d in the real protocol and in the simulation. When d 6= 0, the simulator







. Otherwise, the simulator
outputs (t0, d,⊥) where t0 ← Zmq . The non-aborting case of this simulation
is indistinguishable from the non-aborting case of the real protocol simil-
lary. Bρ + η mod q in t = Aµ + Bρ + η mod q in real protocol can be
regarded as an instance of LWEn,m,q,σ3(D
n
σ2
), which is hard under the condi-
tion, spLWEn,m+n,q,s1,ρ,θ is hard. Thus t is computationally indistinguishable
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from t0, which is sampled from uniform random distribution over Zmq .
5.3 Application to LWE-based Threshold Cry-
tosystems
5.3.1 Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge for Thresh-
old Decryption
Proof for Committed Messages
Like our zero-knowledge proof of opening information, let c = Am +
Br + e mod q be a commitment that is published by the prover. The prover
can prove that c is a commitment of the message m. This can be done by
showing that the prover can prove he knows a valid randomness of c without
revealing it. In this case, the public input is (c,m) and the private input is
(r, e):
• P computes t = Bρ + η mod q where ρ ← Dnσ2 , η ← D
m
σ3
, and sends t
to V.
• V sends a random integer d ∈ [−β, β] ∩ Z.
• P checks d ∈ [−β, β] ∩ Z, and computes sr = ρ + dr mod q, se =
η + de mod q. If d = 0, P sends sm = 0, sr, se to V. Otherwise, P










(η), and ⊥ with probability 1− p.
• V accepts iff sm = 0, t + dc = Bsr + se, ‖sr‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and ‖se‖∞ ≤
12σ3.
We now prove that the above protocol is indeed a zero-knowledge proof.





overwhelmingly for the relations:
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Proof. We can prove completeness, special soundness, and HVCZK of this
protocol as in the previous case. The only difference is sm = 0. In this case,
the simulator set the s′m as 0 vector.
• Completeness: The verifier accepts with overwhelming probability if the






• Special Soundness: Given a commitment c and a pair of accepting tran-




e)) where d 6= d′, we can extract a
vaild opening information of c.
• Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Transcripts of the protocol with an
honest verifier can be simulated with computationally indistinguishable
distribution.
Proof of Linear Relation
We now describe our zero-knowledge proof of linear relation. Let ci =
Ami + Bri + ei mod q for i = 1, 2 be commitments that are published
by the prover such that m2 = g(m1) for a linear function g. The goal of
following protocol is to prove the linear relation of commited messages in
zero-knowledge fashion. This can be done by modifying the previous zero-
knowledge proof of opening information. The public inputs are ci and g for
i = 1, 2, and the private inputs are (ri, ei) for i = 1, 2:
• P computes ti = Aµi+Bρi+ηi mod q for i = 1, 2 where µ1 ← Zlq, µ2 =
g(µ1), ρi ← Dnσ2 , ηi ← D
m
σ3
for i = 1, 2, and sends t1, t2 to V.
• V sends a random integer d ∈ [−β, β] ∩ Z.
• P checks d ∈ [−β, β]∩Z, and computes sm,i = µi+dmi mod q, sr,i = ρi+
dri mod q, se,i = ηi+dei mod q for i = 1, 2. If d = 0, P sends sm,i, sr,i, se,i
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and ⊥ with probability 1− p.
• V accepts iff ti + dci = Asm,i + Bsr,i + se,i mod q, ‖sr,i‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and
‖se,i‖∞ ≤ 12σ3 for i = 1, 2, and sm,2 = g(sm,1).
We now prove that the above protocol is indeed a zero-knowledge proof.







overwhelmingly for the relations:
Proof. We prove the protocol satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: The verifier accepts with overwhelming probability if the








• Special Soundness: Given commitments c1, c2 and a pair of accepting
transcripts













where d 6= d′, we can extract a vaild opening information of c1, and c2.
• Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Transcripts of the protocol with an
honest verifier can be simulated with computationally indistinguishable
distribution.
We can prove completeness, special soundness, and HVCZK of this pro-
tocol as in the previous case. The only difference is sm = 0. In this case, the
simulator set the s′m as 0 vector.
Completeness: When d = 0, P sends sm,i = µi, sr,i = ρi, se,i = ηi to V for
i = 1, 2. Thus ti + dci = ti = Aµi + Bρi + ηi = Asm,i + Bsr,i + se,i mod q
for i = 1, 2. Since ρi ← Dnσ2 , ηi ← D
m
σ3
, ‖sr,i‖∞ = ‖ρi‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and
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‖se,i‖∞ = ‖ηi‖∞ ≤ 12σ3 for i = 1, 2 with overwhelming probability by lemma
5.3.1. Note that sm,2 = µ2 = g(µ1) = g(sm,1)
In the case d 6= 0, P sends sm,i = µi+dmi, sr,i = ρi+dri, se,i = ηi+dei to
V with probability close to 1∏2
i=1M2,iM3,i
overwhelmingly by the rejection sam-
pling lemma. Thus Asm,i+Bsr,i+se,i = Aµi+Bρi+ηi+d(Ami+Bri+ei) =
ti+dci for i = 1, 2. Note that the distributions of sr,i = ρi+dri, se,i = ηi+dei
for i = 1, 2 are statistically close to Dnσ2 , D
m
σ3
respectively by the rejection
sampling lemma. Hence, ‖sr,i‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and ‖se,i‖∞ ≤ 12σ3 for i = 1, 2
with overwhelming probability by lemma 5.3.1, and sm,2 = µ2 + dm2 =








Special Soundness: Suppose given two accepting transcripts













where d 6= d′. Then the following equations are hold:









By subtracting the above equations, we get:
(d− d′)ci = A(sm,i − s′m,i) + B(sr,i − s′r,i) + (se,i − s′e,i) mod q
In other words, we have a witness ((d−d′)−1(sm,i−s′m,i), (sr,i−s′r,i), (se,i−
s′e,i), d−d′) for (A,B, ci) such that ‖sr,i−s′r‖∞ ≤ 24σ2, and ‖se−s′e‖∞ ≤ 24σ3
for i = 1, 2.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Let c1, c2 and challenge d are given as
inputs. First, the simulator samples s′m,1 ← Zlq, s′r,i ← Dnσ2 , s
′
e,i ← Dmσ3 , and
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computes s′m,2 = g(s
′






e,i−dci for i = 1, 2. In the case













statistically indistinguishable from accepting transcripts of the real protocol,











indistinguishable from the the distribution of real response by the rejection






e,i, and d in
the real protocol and in the simulation. When d 6= 0, the simulator outputs















erwise, the simulator outputs (t0,1, t0,2, d,⊥) where t0,i ← Zmq for i = 1, 2.
The non-aborting case of this simulation is indistinguishable from the non-
aborting case of the real protocol simillary. Bρi+ηi mod q in ti = Aµi+Bρi+




which is hard under the condition, spLWEn,m+n,q,s1,ρ,θ is hard. Thus ti is
computationally indistinguishable from t0,i, which is sampled from uniform
random distribution over Zmq
Proof of Sum
We now describe our zero-knowledge proof of sum. Let ci = Ami+Bri+
ei mod q for i = 1, 2, 3 be commitments that are published by the prover
such that m3 = m1 + m2. The goal of following protocol is to prove the sum
relation of commited messages in zero-knowledge fashion. The idea of the
zero-knowledge proof is similar to the previous proof of linear relation. We
now describe the zero-knowledge proof of sum as follows. The public inputs
are ci for i = 1, 2, 3, and the private inputs are (ri, ei) for i = 1, 2, 3:
• P computes ti = Aµi + Bρi + ηi mod q for i = 1, 2, 3 where µ1, µ2 ←
Zlq, µ3 = µ1 + µ2, ρi ← Dnσ2 , ηi ← D
m
σ3
for i = 1, 2, 3, and sends t1, t2, t3
to V.
• V sends a random integer d ∈ [−β, β] ∩ Z.
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• P checks d ∈ [−β, β] ∩ Z, and computes sm,i = µi + dmi mod q, sr,i =
ρi + dri mod q, se,i = ηi + dei mod q for i = 1, 2, 3. If d = 0, P sends
sm,i, sr,i, se,i for i = 1, 2, 3 to V. Otherwise, P sends sm,i, sr,i, se,i for












(ηi), and ⊥ with probability 1− p.
• V accepts iff ti + dci = Asm,i + Bsr,i + se,i mod q, ‖sr,i‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and
‖se,i‖∞ ≤ 12σ3 for i = 1, 2, 3, and sm,3 = sm,1 + sm,2.
We now prove that the above protocol is indeed a zero-knowledge proof.







overwhelmingly for the relations:
Proof. We prove the protocol satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: The verifier accepts with overwhelming probability if the








• Special Soundness: Given commitments c1, c2, c3 and a pair of accept-
ing transcripts
























where d 6= d′, we can extract a vaild opening information of c1, c2 and
c3.
• Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Transcripts of the protocol with an
honest verifier can be simulated with computationally indistinguishable
distribution.
We can prove completeness, special soundness, and zero knowledgeness
of this protocol as in the previous case, proof of linear relation. The only
difference is sm = 0. In this case, the simulator set the s
′
m as 0 vector.
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Proof of Bound
We now describe our zero-knowledge proof of bound. Let c = Am +
Br + e mod q be a commitment that is published by the prover. The goal
of the following protocol is to prove the smallness of committed messages
in zero-knowledge fashion. The idea of the zero-knowledge proof is to check
smallness of a commited message when a short random vector is added. We
now describe the zero-knowledge proof of bound as follows. The public inputs
is c , and the private inputs is (m, r, e):




Z)l, ρ← Dnσ2 , η ← D
m
σ3
, and sends t to V.
• V sends a random integer d← {0, 1}.
• P checks d ∈ {0, 1}, and computes sm = µ + dm mod q, sr = ρ +
dr mod q, se = η + de mod q. When d = 0, if ‖sm‖∞ > γmβm/2,
P sends ⊥, otherwise sends sm, sr, se to V. When d 6= 0, if ‖sm‖∞ >







(η), and ⊥ with probability
1− p.
• V accepts iff t + dc = Asm + Bsr + se mod q, ‖sm‖∞ ≤ γmβm/2,
‖sr‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and ‖se‖∞ ≤ 12σ3.
We now prove that the above protocol is indeed a zero-knowledge proof.







overwhelmingly for the relations where p′ = (1− 2βm
2βm(1+γm/2)+1
)l:
Proof. We prove the protocol satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness: The verifier accepts with overwhelming probability if the
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• Special Soundness: Given a commitment c and a pair of accepting tran-






e)) where d 6= d′, we can extract
a vaild opening information of c whose infinite norm of message m is
bounded by γmβm/2.
• Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Transcripts of the protocol with an
honest verifier can be simulated with computationally indistinguishable
distribution.
Completeness: The probability that a single coefficient of sm will cause
an abortion of the protocol is 2βm
2βm(1+γm/2)+1
. Thus, the probability that sm
will cause an abortion of the protocol is 1− (1− 2βm
2βm(1+γm/2)+1
)l = 1− p′.
When d = 0, and ‖sm‖∞ ≤ γmβm/2, P sends sm = µ, sr = ρ, se = η
to V. Thus t + dc = t = Aµ + Bρ + η = Asm + Bsr + se mod q. Since
ρ ← Dnσ2 , η ← D
m
σ3
, ‖sr‖∞ = ‖ρ‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and ‖se‖∞ = ‖η‖∞ ≤ 12σ3
with overwhelming probability by lemma 5.3.1. The probability that this
case occurs is p
′
2
In the case d = 1, if ‖sm‖∞ ≤ γmβm/2, P sends sm = µ + m, sr =
ρ+r, se = η+e to V with probability close to
1
M2M3
overwhelmingly by the re-
jection sampling lemma. Thus Asm+Bsr+se = Aµ+Bρ+η+(Am+Br+e) =
t + dc. Note that the distribution of sr = ρ + r, se = η + e are statisti-
cally close to Dnσ2 , D
m
σ3
respectively by the rejection sampling lemma. Hence,
‖sr‖∞ ≤ 12σ2, and ‖se‖∞ ≤ 12σ3 with overwhelming probability by lemma








Special Soundness: Suppose two accepting transcripts (t, d, (sm, sr, se)),




e)) where d 6= d′ are given. Then the following equations are
hold:
t + dc = Asm + Bsr + se mod q
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By subtracting the above equations, we get:
(d− d′)c = A(sm − s′m) + B(sr − s′r) + (se − s′e) mod q
In other words, we have a witness ((d − d′)−1(sm − s′m), (sr − s′r), (se −
s′e), d−d′) for (A,B, c) such that ‖sr− s′r‖∞ ≤ 24σ2, and ‖se− s′e‖∞ ≤ 24σ3.
Note that ‖(d− d′)−1(sm − s′m)‖∞ = ‖sm − s′m‖∞ ≤ 2‖sm‖∞ = γmβm.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: Let c and challenge d are given as in-
puts. First, the simulator samples s′m ← {−γmβm/2, γmβm/2}l, s′r ← Dnσ2 ,






e−dc. In the case d = 0, the




e)) with probability p
′. This is statistically
indistinguishable from accepting transcripts of the real protocol, since the




e) is statistically indistinguishable from the
the distribution of real response by the rejection sampling lemma, and t is




e, and d in the real protocol and in the simu-







. Otherwise, the simulator outputs (t0, d,⊥) where t0 ← Zmq . The non-
aborting case of this simulation is indistinguishable from the non-aborting
case of the real protocol simillary. Bρ+ η mod q in t = Aµ+ Bρ+ η mod q




is hard under the condition, spLWEn,m+n,q,s1,ρ,θ is hard. Thus t is computa-
tionally indistinguishable from t0, which is sampled from uniform random
distribution over Zmq .
5.3.2 Actively Secure Threshold Cryptosystems
In this section, we explain how to convert LWE-based cryptosystems
into actively secure threshold cryptosystem with the proofs which is intro-
duced in previous section. This conversion can be applied to a broad class of
LWE-based PKE’s and FHE’s such as [Reg09], [LP11], [CHK+16], [GSW13],
[BV14], [ZB12] satisfying the following properties. The decryption algorithm
consists of two procedures. In the first step, the algorithm takes as input a
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secret key sk ∈ Zn×lq and a ciphertext ct ∈ Zlq and computes a function fct,
which is linear in sk to output encode(m) + e where each ei ∈ [−B,B] is an
error term bounded by for some B  q and m ∈ {0, 1}l is the message of the
ciphertext ct. In the second step, it properly decodes the output of the first
step to recover message m. Since the decryption algorithm performs linear
function fct with the key sk, one can construct a threshold version of the de-
cryption naively: Simply split the secret key sk with a linear secret sharing
scheme Π with some access structure A on a set of servers S = {S1, . . . , SN}
into sk1, . . . , skN , and transmit the secret key share ski to the server Si for
all i. Then each server compute fct(ski) as a partial decryption. For any set
T ∈ A ⊆ 2S, there exist a set of coefficients {ci}i∈T such that
∑
i∈T ciski = sk
and then by linearity of fct, the combiner gets cifct(ski) = encode(m) + e.
To sum up, naive version of threshold decryption can be obtained by apply-
ing a linear secret sharing since the decryption algorithm consists of linear
operations. However, a sufficient numbers of outputs of partial decryption
allows a reconstruction of the secret key share ski by linearty of fct. In order
to adress this problem, a masking is necessary i.e. each server must output
the partial decryption as
fct(ski) + esmudge
where each component of esmudge is sampled from a uniform distribution over
sufficiently large interval. The following lemma tell us how big error bounds
are required. This technique is known as ”smudging”.
Lemma 5.3.1 ([Koh16] , Smudging). Let k be the security parameter and let
negl : N → R>0 be a negligible function. Let b1(k), b2(k) ∈ N be bounds with
b1(k)/b2(k) ≤ negl(k). Let e(k) ∈ [−b1, b1] be an arbitrary integer and ψ(k) be
the uniform distributionon [−b2, b2]∩Z. Then the distribution e+ψ obtained
by drawing an ẽ ∈ ψ and returning e + ẽ, is statistically indistinguishable to
the distribution ψ.
By applying the above technique, we get a LWE-based threshold cryp-
tosystem that is passively secure, and IND-CCA secure in random oracle
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model. One can convert the threshold cryptosystem to a actively secure one
by adding some additional proof for decryption procedure. This can be done
via non-interactive version of the previous zero-knowledge proofs. One can
obtain these proofs by applying the “Fiat-Shamir Heuristic”: The challenge
c is computed by a prover as c = H(t), where H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t be
a hash function. Let proofi = (proofbd,i, prooflin,i, proofsum,i, proofmes,i) be
the non-interactive version of the previous zero-knowledge proofs. Sine one
can get negligible soundness error and overwhelming completeness error from
parallel repeations, we assume the proof proofi also achieves that. We first
thresholdize the spLWE-based KEM in [CHK+16].
• TKEM.Params(λ): generate a bit-length of seed y and spLWE param-
eters n,m, q, s, ρ, θ, s′, ρ′, θ′ with λ-bit security. Publish all parameters
by pp.
• TKEM.Keygen(pp): sample seedA ← {0, 1}y,A ← Gen(seedA), e ←
DmZ,s and s← U(Xn,ρ,θ), and compute b = As+e ∈ Zmq . For a secret key
sk = s, s is randomly divided into t pieces sk1 = s1, . . . , skt = st. The
verification key vk is the description of the commitment scheme. The
verification key share vki = Com(ski), ski is the opening information
of vki. publish a corresponding public key pk = (seedA,b).
• TKEM.Encap(pk,pp): sample u← Xm,ρ′,θ′ , (e1, e2)← DZ,s′ ×DnZ,s′ and
e3 ∈ {0, 1}. Let v = uTb + e1 ∈ Zq and v̄ = 2v + e3 ∈ Z2q. Compute
c1 = 〈v̄〉2 ∈ Z2 and c2 = uTA + e2 ∈ Znq from A ← Gen(seedA).
Send a ciphertext c = (c1, c2) ∈ Z2 × Znq to the receiver, and store an
ephemeral secret key µ = bv̄e2 ∈ Z2.
• TKEM.PartialDecap(c, ski, vk, vki): Compute wi = 2c2T si + esm,i ∈ Zq,
Com(esm,i), Com(c2
T si), Com(c2
T si+esm,i), and send them with proofi.
• TKEM.Combine(c, {wi}ti=1, {vki}ti=1, (Com(esm,i), Com(c2T si), Com(c2T si+
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We now construct a (t, t)-threshold public cryptosystem based on the
spLWE-based threshold KEM.
• TPKE1.Params(λ): let ` be a message length, and run TKEM.Params(λ)
with `. Publish all parameters by pp.(For simple description, we assume
that l = 1.)
• TPKE1.Keygen(pp): output a key pair, and secret key shares (pk, sk),
s1, . . . , st, and verification key vk, its shares vki’s← TKEM.Keygen(pp).
• TPKE1.Enc(pk,m, pp): for c, µ ← TKEM.Encap(pk,pp), compute c′ =
m⊕ µ and output a ciphertext (c, c′).
• TPKE1.PartialDec((c, c′), ski, vk, vki): Output wi, Com(esm,i), Com(c2T si),
Com(c2
T si + esm,i), proofi ← TKEM.PartialDecap(c, ski, vk, vki)
• TPKE1.Combine((c, c′), {wi}ti=1, (Com(esm,i), Com(c2T si), Com(c2T si+
esm,i)), proofi): for µ = TKEM.Combine(c, {wi}ti=1, (Com(esm,i), Com(c2T si),
Com(c2
T si + esm,i)), proofi), output m = c
′ ⊕ µ.
Finally, we have a LWE-based threshold public-key cryptosystem PKE2 which
is actively secure in random oracle model.
• PKE2.Params(λ): let ` be a message length and ki > 0 be integers such
that hash functions G : {0, 1}k1+` → {0, 1}∗, H : {0, 1}k1 → {0, 1}k2
and H ′ : {0, 1}k1 → {0, 1}k3 have λ-bit security. Let pp be an output of
KEM.Params(λ) with k1. Publish `, pp and ki.
• PKE2.Keygen(pp): output a key pair, and secret key shares (pk, sk),
s1, . . . , st, and verification key vk, its shares vki’s← TKEM.Keygen(pp).
• PKE2.Enc(pk,m, pp, ki): randomly choose ω ← {0, 1}k1 , and let cm =
H(ω)⊕m. Compute ch = H ′(ω) and (c, c′)← PKE1.Enc(pk, ω;G(ω||cm)).
Output a ciphertext (c, c′, ch, cm).
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• PKE2.PartialDec((c, c′, ch, cm), ski, vk, vki): Output wi, Com(esm,i), Com(c2T si),
Com(c2
T si + esm,i), proofi ← KEM.PartialDecap(c, ski, vk, vki)
• PKE2.Combine((c, c′, ch, cm), {wi}ti=1, pp, ki, Com(c2T si), Com(c2T si +
esm,i)), proofi): Compute ω = PKE1.Combine((c, c
′), {wi}ti=1, Com(c2T si),
Com(c2
T si + esm,i)), proofi) and m = H(ω) ⊕ cm. Check whether
(c, c′) = PKE1.Enc(pk, ω;G(w||cm)) and ch = H ′(ω). If so, output




In this thesis, we introduced a variant of LWE with a sparse secret, spLWE
for more efficient construction of public-key encryption and commitment
schemes. First, we define the variant problem, spLWE, and provide analy-
sis for it: We show that spLWE can be reduced from LWE, which means that
the hardness of spLWE can also be based on the worst-case lattice problems,
gapSVP and SIVP. On the other hand, we exclude the parameters which
have provable security from our reduction since it is not tight enough to be
useful in parameter setting. We also extend all known LWE attacks in order
to estimate concrete hardness of spLWE. These are used to select efficient
and secure parameters: It requires relatively larger dimension than that of
LWE to maintain security. However, we verify that the problem of increase
in dimension can be relieved by using a small modulus q. In conclusion, we
can choose more compact parameters in spLWE-based encryption and com-
mitment schemes. Of course, new developments of cryptanalysis for spLWE
with a bigger community would be required.
From the analysis of spLWE, we propose efficient post-quantum public-key
encryption and commitment schemes with related zero knowledge protocols
based on spLWE: We suggest an IND-CPA PKE and its IND-CCA conversion
in the quantum random oracle model by applying the modified Fujisaki-
Okamoto conversion of Unruh. In commitment case, we give a variety of
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versions of commitment schemes which are based on LWE and its variants.
In particular, we also propose a commitment scheme dedicated for the zero-
knowledge proofs suggested in this thesis. Finally, as a application, we show
how to convert our PKE into a threshold cryptosystem which has active
security with previous constructions.
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Sánchez, and Peter Schwabe. High-speed signatures from stan-
dard lattices. In International Conference on Cryptology and
Information Security in Latin America, pages 84–103. Springer,
2014.
[DL+15] Augot Daniel, Batina Lejla, et al. Initial recom-
mendations of long-term secure post-quantum systems.
Technical report, 2015. http://pqcrypto.eu.org/docs/
initial-recommendations.pdf.
[DM15] Lauren De Meyer. Security of LWE-based cryptosystems.
PhD thesis, 2015. https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/
publications/thesis-267.pdf.
[DTV15] Alexandre Duc, Florian Tramèr, and Serge Vaudenay. Better
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랜덤선형부호의 복호화 문제(Learning with Errors)는 2005년 Regev가 소개한 이후
로다양한암호학적스킴을설계하는데이용되고있다.최근에는키교환,공개키암호,
서명 스킴과 같은 기본적인 암호학적 알고리즘 뿐만아니라 완전 동형암호, 다중 선
형함수와 같은 고차원의 암호학적 알고리즘을 설계하는데 이용되고 있다. 한편 최근
양자 컴퓨팅 기술의 급속한 발전으로 인해 이론적인 연구보다는 보다 더 실제로 사
용될 수 있는 암호학적 스킴을 연구, 개발하는일이 중요해졌다. 이러한 배경에서, 이
논문에서는 양자 컴퓨터 시대를 대비한 효율적인 공개키 암호 및 commitment 스
킴 또한 이와 관련된 영지식 증명 프로토콜과 LWE 문제 기반의 임계암호시스템을
제안한다. 효율성을 위해 특별히 랜덤선형부호의 복호화 문제에서 비밀 벡터를 스파
스한벡터로생성하는변형된형태를사용하며,이변형된문제의어려움및제안하는
스킴들의 안전성을 제시한다.
주요어휘:격자,랜덤선형부호의복호화문제,스파스백터,공개키암호, com-
mitment, 임계 암호시스템
학번: 2014-30074
